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This paper deals in general terms with the way the notion of “translational 
norm” has been used in research on interpreting, mainly in papers by Shlesinger 
(1989 and 1999), Harris (1990), Schjoldager (1995), Gile (1999), and, more 
recently, Garzone (2002).1 I shall then advance reasons why this notion could 
find wider application, or at least be made more explicit. I shall not be looking, 
yet, at a corpus of scholarly or non-scholarly discourse stating more or less 
implicitly what the norm is,2 although this body of “extratextual 
pronouncements” is, as Shlesinger (1999) noted, an important source of 
evidence for the norms operating in interpreting (with some caveats concerning 
the gap between normative discourse and norms in practice, as recalled in Toury 
1998). A recent example of how prevailing norms for a given setting, 
conference interpreting, can be elicited from discourse and then compared with 
actual behaviour is provided in the study by Diriker (2004). For the time being, 
however, I shall keep within the limits of a broad and admittedly abstract 
argument in favour of a “thicker” description of norms in interpreting, 
substantiated by anecdotal evidence that I hope will be deemed relevant. 
1. Norms as the key to variability in Descriptive Translation Studies 
The main result of the strand of research known as Descriptive Translation 
Studies3 may well lie in the fact that it has “discovered the complexity of 
translation” as a sociocultural product; in this way, translation appears as 
“characterised precisely by its variability” (Toury 1998:12), whereas essentialist 
                                                          
1 This paper documents a step in my ongoing research on interpreting within the 
framework of the EU institutions (moving from Marzocchi 1998). I am indebted to 
Miriam Shlesinger and Franz Pöchhacker for inspiration, for their constructive 
criticism on previous drafts and for drawing my attention to relevant literature. My 
thanks also go to the Editors for their valuable support. Of course, I remain solely 
responsible for the arguments put forward. 
2 An interesting corpus to this end could consist in the early writings on interpreting 
(1930 – 1970) that were the object of a recent study by Falbo (cf. in this respect 
2004: 21 ff. and passim). 
3 Hereinafter DTS, although the acronym misleadingly suggests a monolithical 
school of thought. 
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statements as to what constitutes true or faithful translation are determined by 
historical contingencies and are culture- and period-bound. 
Accordingly, the move towards awareness of the historical variability of the 
object of study can be said to have implied a radical undefining of translation. 
A-priori definitions were felt by DTS scholars to project the researcher’s own 
assumptions on translation onto a corpus that was often culturally and 
historically distant; this would involve the risk of circular reasoning, as 
translational corpora selected according to a particular definition of translation 
are bound to confirm the definition (cf. Hermans 1999, ch. 4).  
An instrument of the attempt to have “variability in all its facets introduced 
into the notion of translation itself” (Toury 1998:13) is the notion of norms, 
used as an explanatory tool to account for the diverse ways translation is 
historically, socially and culturally determined. Norms can be defined as 
regularities of translatorial behaviour, departure from which implies some form 
of social sanction, that in turn reflect the values shared by a social group. 
Historical instances of translational behaviour can then be explained in terms of 
– preliminary norms, governing for example the choice of source texts, of 
source languages, the option to translate directly or through a relay language, 
or to translate into the foreign language; in other words, what Toury terms 
“translation policy”;  
– initial norms, governing a very broad orientation towards adequacy with 
respect to the source text or acceptability within the target culture;  
– operational norms, that guide decision-making during the process of 
translation at macro- and micro-structural level (cf. Toury 1995, ch. 2). 
Different articulations of the concept have been proposed, notably by 
Chesterman (1993), who suggested a distinction between norms operating at the 
level of the translator’s role and of the relationship between ST and TT 
(professional norms) and norms pertaining to what is expected from a 
translation product to be recognized as such (expectancy norms).  
2. Norms in interpreting: early doubts and explorations 
The beginning of explicit discussion on translational norms in interpreting can 
be traced back to a programmatic contribution by Miriam Shlesinger (1989) in 
the ‘Forum’ section of the inaugural issue of Target. Shlesinger’s paper strikes 
the reader – this reader at least – for its methodological insight and scepticism at 
the same time. On the one hand it cast light on the methodological advantages, 
for TS as a whole, of extending the concept of norms to interpreting, in a way 
that was entirely in line with the systemic approach of DTS and fitted neatly 
within the general framework of TS as charted by Holmes in the 1970s. On the 
other hand Shlesinger discussed doubts as to how to elicit norms and even as to 
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whether norms do operate in conference interpreting, that is, as to whether 
interpreters’ translatorial behaviour is determined by anything else than personal 
preference or cognitive constraints (cf. her later paper on this subject, 1999). 
Shlesinger’s doubts were motivated by the size and scattered distribution of the 
profession, thought not to favour the socialization processes by which norms 
emerge and are passed on; however, the fact that interpreter training is (was, 
rather) concentrated in a few institutions could in fact lead to more consistent 
transmission of norms to future interpreters. On balance, this led Shlesinger to 
conclude that norms may well govern interpreter behaviour, despite the 
difficulties in eliciting them.  
Other methodological considerations advanced by Shlesinger concerned the 
difficulties in finding and designing corpora, legal obstacles to recording 
performances, and the impact of monitoring on performance. Apart from these, 
however, a key insight in Shlesinger’s paper – again, firmly within a DTS 
framework – is that in order to study norms in interpreting one needs to place 
interpreting within a ‘system’. Given the interactional nature of interpreting, the 
system cannot be defined at the level of the ST, nor at the level of a vaguely 
defined receiving culture, and must therefore be conceptualised at the level of 
the interpreting event or setting. A thread may be seen running from 
Shlesinger’s call for a systemic look at interpreting settings to later research, 
such as Pöchhacker’s detailed analysis of the context of his case–study (1994), 
or to Alexieva’s (1997) reasoned typology of interpreter–mediated events. 
Although Alexieva draws her analytical tools from sources other than DTS, her 
analysis of settings in terms of sociolinguistic parameters could be 
complemented by looking at the different professional and expectancy norms 
associated with each constellation of parameters. 
A response to Shlesinger’s early methodological doubts came very quickly 
from Harris (1990). In Harris’ reply, observations from specific sectors of 
practice, that testify to the variability of norms in different interpreting settings 
are somewhat inconsistently juxtaposed to an essentialist statement as to a 
“fundamental norm” constituting all translatorial activity, that of acting “as a 
honest spokesperson”. The opening statement illustrates how norms not only 
govern interpreters’ behaviour, but are also expected to do so by fellow 
practitioners and scholars, in other words, it testifies to the ‘psychological 
reality’ of norms: Harris states that norms do in fact operate in interpreting, and 
that “anybody well acquainted with the activity could point to some of [them]” 
(1990: 115). He then moves on to name a few ‘norms’ organized around binary 
oppositions:  
1. professional vs. natural interpreting (the respective norms being speaking in 
the first person vs. reporting speech);  
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2. conference interpreting (CI) vs. TV interpreting (the norms being 
“conventional fictions” in CI such as 30-minute turns regardless of change 
of speaker, vs. preference for consistency of voice, gender and prosodic 
features on TV); 
3. his own training experience at Ottawa, and Russian tradition, vs. Western, 
AIIC practice when it comes to encouraging or frowning upon interpreting 
into the B language; 
4. interpreted speech vs. written translation (production errors and calques 
being more acceptable in the former than in the latter). 
The examples presented by Harris actually represent different levels on a 
continuum between habits, preferences and socially sanctioned norms, but also 
raise the issue of how to distinguish between the statement of a norm and its 
practical operation, and between stating that there is a norm and eliciting it from 
textual data.  
The same lack of a clear distinction between habitual behaviour and a 
socially sanctioned norm can be found years later in a paper by Schjoldager 
(1995). This paper is a more articulated attempt to infer an initial norm from the 
way interpreters treat a particular cultural item in a corpus of Danish–English 
interpretation. However, the fact that the author’s research project underwent 
changes in progress explains a certain inconsistency: the stage is set in an 
evaluative framework, where performances by two groups of subjects are to be 
compared in terms of equivalence, in a search for interpreting quality. The 
conclusions are then drawn in a descriptive framework, in terms of norms 
governing the choice of how to treat the cultural item while coping with 
processing constraints. Nevertheless, the pattern that emerged deserves further 
study, even though the author formulates it rather sweepingly as a generally 
valid norm: “[The interpreter] is allowed to say something which is apparently 
unrelated to the source text […] provided s/he can say something that is 
contextually plausible” (Schjoldager 1995:310, my emphasis – the normative 
discourse is implicit for example in “is allowed to”). In fact, apart from the 
limited size of the corpus, it is the lack of information on the social acceptance 
of this translatorial behaviour that makes me hesitate to call this a norm 
governing interpreting. It would have been interesting to have Schjoldager’s 
subjects comment on their performance, or have other students or trainers assess 
the performance, before concluding that the subjects’ behaviour was in line with 
a norm. 
Going back to Harris’s response to Shlesinger, as could be expected from a 
scholar coming from an entirely different background, no notion of system 
comes to organize relations in Harris’ examples, although Harris identifies 
different social agents as those who actually set the norms: TV managers, 
conference organizers, trainers, institutions. Yet it is precisely the apparently 
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heterogeneous character of Harris’ reply that illustrates the undefining potential 
of the notion of norms. Examples in the very short response given by Harris 
range from what is known as natural interpreting, performed by children in 
bilingual communities, through interpreting in conference and diplomatic 
settings, to legal and TV interpreting; the author introduces them stating that 
“norms will not be the same everywhere” (Harris 1990:115). In other words, the 
simple fact of reflecting rather loosely on norms in interpreting elicited an 
academic discourse that began building bridges between different interpreting 
settings, otherwise still marked by different social and academic prestige and by 
separate research paradigms, with a cognitive and process-based one prevailing 
in conference interpreting and a more socio-culturally oriented and discourse-
based one in court and community interpreting (despite unifying efforts notably 
by Pöchhacker in his more recent work, and by Diriker 2004).  
Gile, in a contribution to a discussion on translational norms in 1998, also 
saw the research potential in a norm-based approach to interpreting. He saw it 
from two points of view:  
– as a way to open up the object of study to paradigms that had not figured 
prominently in his conceptual toolbox, or at least had gone unnoticed in the 
reception of his writings; to him, norms could be a tool to “foster more 
empirical research into interpreting and more interdisciplinarity, in particular 
with sociology and with research on written translation” (1998:99);  
– as a way to have research itself undergo a relativizing scrutiny: research is 
seen as norm–governed behaviour and, at least to judge by the following 
sharp criticism, the prevailing paradigms loose any aura of intrinsic, 
objective adequacy: “research in the field has been increasingly governed by 
status-oriented norms at the expense of problem-solving. Becoming aware of 
these norms and their operation is important for researchers in the field” 
(1998:99). 
3. Norms in cognitive paradigms and in the social construction of 
interpreting 
A shared concern in Gile’s and in Shlesinger’s contribution – perhaps the main 
concern – is the extent to which norm-governed behaviour on the part of 
research informants can interfere with the results of experimental or 
observational studies; this is a problem inasmuch as the studies were originally 
designed to relate behaviour to cognitive constraints. Gile (1998) reports an 
experiment on the variability of fidelity perceptions, looking at how target-
speech segments were reported by participants as errors or omissions; among 
the results, he found that the same TT segments were by no means reported as 
errors or omissions by all assessors, and wondered whether they were simply 
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missed or whether the different appreciation reflected different fidelity norms. 
Similarly, the lack of correlation between the number of errors identified and the 
general impression of fidelity reported by the assessors led Gile to hypothesize 
that something else – the operation of a norm – must account for the way an 
overall performance is evaluated, possibly overruling the perception of 
individual errors at micro level.  
Gile also noted that norms should be taken into consideration in studies 
comparing ST and TT on the basis of propositional analysis, if results are not to 
be distorted by deliberate, norm-based departures from literalness. In Gile’s 
terms, norms presiding over the assessment of performance should enter into the 
picture in such studies because otherwise 
the metric chosen by researchers […] may measure the opposite of what 
it is supposed to measure. A correct identification of norms is necessary 
in order to calibrate the propositional or other metrics used (Gile 
1998:99). 
Along very similar lines, Shlesinger’s (1999) concern in a study of how 
interpreters handle long strings of modifiers is how to “tease apart” omissions or 
rearrangements that are due to cognitive overload from those that reflect the 
norms governing what is sufficient output in simultaneous interpreting. In a 
move that illustrates how experimental and discoursal data can be analyzed to 
elicit norms, Shlesinger then surveys the literature on interpreting, in search of 
normative statements that could account for her subjects’ behaviour. This leads 
her to the very sensible conclusion that interpreters abide by what could be 
termed a “condensation norm”, that “not only condones but often encourages 
strategic macroprocessing”, so that “not every element of every proposition in 
the source text needs to be reproduced as such. It is appropriate for a 
simultaneous interpreter to produce the underlying meaning of the proposition” 
(Shlesinger 1999:69). Intuitively, this is corroborated by training experience 
(condensation techniques figure equally prominently in the curriculum in Trieste 
and in recent research on strategies adopted by students, cf. Donato 2003); it is 
also in line with the long-standing discourse on conference interpreting as 
documented in professional literature and analyzed by Diriker (2004) and Jones’ 
recent Conference Interpreting Explained. However, in addition to seeing the 
operation of norms in interpreting as a “how-to-tease-apart-from-the-cognitive” 
issue, the institutional and social construction of norms should also be 
investigated, e.g. the role of training and professional institutions in shaping and 
passing on this and other norms. It may also be the case that norms start their 
‘lifecycle’ as a strategy to cope with cognitive constraints in a given situation 
and are then interiorized and generalized, as could have been the case with 
condensation or “macro-processing”.  
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Things become more problematic, in my opinion, when professional or 
academic discourse elevates a particular norm to a defining trait of (segments 
of) the interpreting profession, i.e. a tool to maintain self-perception, as is 
testified by the countless statements routinely heard to the effect that translators 
say it all, word for word, whereas conference interpreters get the “real” message 
across (if possible in a polished, TL-idiomatic version). Diriker (2004: 32 ff.) 
shows how in the discourse on interpreting condensation and “macro-
processing” coexist side by side with ambitious claims to true “fidelity”; this is 
taken to distinguish interpreting from a received idea of written translation as a 
word-for-word exercise. This could be dismissed as a hasty but innocuous 
generalization were it not for the fact that it may have been instrumental in 
sustaining a status and prestige gap between the different language professions. 
One often finds, among language professionals, evaluative discourse that 
attributes different norms to different settings, even within the limited field of 
oral translation. The “getting the message” vs. “word-for-word” argument, for 
example, has been invoked in discourse by opposite camps: to underscore the 
interpreter’s sovereign intellectual command of the ST and its cultural 
implications as opposed to the translator’s purported literalness (again, see 
Diriker 2004 for quotes from professionals and organizations employing 
interpreters), but also to suggest an entirely different hierarchy, as is illustrated 
by the introduction to a standard work on court interpreting:  
Court interpreters must conserve the tone of the language, the timbre of 
the vocabulary with a fidelity that distinguishes the truly great literary 
translations; conference interpreting is first draft translating, Court 
interpreting is polished translation (Gonzales et al. 1991: 27, my 
emphasis). 
In a interesting search for intellectual legitimacy, we see here leading 
scholars marking a milestone in the academic and institutional consolidation of 
their field by linking it to one of the most prestigious types of language work in 
Western tradition, literary translation, with a discourse of, predictably, fidelity 
and truth.  
To understand how statements like the one above are best read as 
instrumental to socio-professional needs, it is perhaps worth contrasting them 
with the landscape of norms on the field. In a study on court interpreting in Italy 
(Siviero 2003), normative statements were elicited in interviews with 
interpreters working in courts in Trieste and Rome. Some of them, mostly self-
taught native speakers from immigrant communities, practising ad-hoc and with 
low professional status, did in fact play down their role and responsibility in the 
proceedings by denying precisely the operational norm of completeness (akin to 
what Gonzalez et al. would call “conservation”). Rather, they reported that their 
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task was simply to ‘get the gist across’, and in plain language for that matter, 
since they mostly interpreted for uneducated defendants. In a previous study, 
interpreters with higher levels of education and permanent status within the 
court in an officially bilingual region reported norms that they perceived as 
more demanding, for example in terms of completeness, fidelity, and role 
delimitation (cf. Roncalli 2001). A difference in actual behaviour was also 
found: interpreters surveyed in the former study often extended their role into 
various forms of interaction with and advocacy for defendants – without other 
participants objecting, for that matter. In the latter study this was not the case, 
although the comparison is made less relevant by the fact that the role of 
interpreters there was much more limited, as almost all other participants were 
bilingual too.  
This difference in reported norms between the standard discourse on court 
interpreting in the USA and the one produced by some practitioners in Italy may 
well be explained, at least partly, by the different levels of professionalization 
achieved by court interpreters in the two countries; an explanation may also lie 
in the different legal systems: Italian proceedings are still largely paper-based 
rather than relying on interaction as in an adversarial system. However, the 
difference may also hint at a discrepancy in the discourse on norms between the 
grassroots and the more established segments of the profession.  
Contextualized studies of conference interpreting also show a discrepancy 
between (assumed) norm and practice. Among the scholars in interpreting more 
aware of methodological issues, Pöchhacker has consistently used concepts 
from TS, in particular from the functionalist approaches of Vermeer and Holz-
Mänttäri (cf. 1994, 1995). Some features of his corpus of interpreted speech, 
such as the choice of forms of address, were easily accounted for in terms of an 
initial norm prescribing “adaptation to target cultural conventions” in 
professional conference interpreting (1995: 47-49). Moving from this 
assumption, Pöchhacker then noted that interpreters may fail to adapt instances 
of culture-bound communication – such as humour – to target cultural 
conventions, since this would involve segmenting the source text in larger units, 
which is at odds with the constraints of time and linearity typical of 
simultaneous interpreting. Interpreters would then be left in the ironic situation 
of being inherently unable to comply with the very initial norm they set 
themselves.  
Pöchhacker’s solution to this paradox lay in suggesting that “cultural 
transfer” would not be a relevant norm in settings marked by a shared, supra-
national socio–professional culture. As a corollary, Pöchhacker doubted that 
Skopos–theoretical concepts were fully applicable to interpreting. Elsewhere I 
suggested – although at that time not on the basis of the notion of norms, cf. 
Marzocchi 1998 – that a solution could also lie in pointing at possible 
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alternatives to adaptation to the target culture, namely at documentary 
translation as a viable initial norm for interpreting, at least in some settings. In 
other words, I was arguing for more caution in assuming that a fully 
instrumental initial norm is viable for conference interpreting, although it may 
appear frequently in professional discourse.4 
The distinction between instrumental and documentary translation was put 
forward by Nord and is well known in Translation Studies (obviously, it also 
partly overlaps with dichotomies such as covert/overt, dynamic/formal, 
domesticating/foreignizing): 
We find two basic types of translation processes. The first aims at 
producing in the target language a kind of document of (certain aspects 
of) a communicative interaction in which a source-culture sender 
communicates with a source-culture audience via the source text under 
source-culture conditions. The second aims at producing in the target 
language an instrument for a new communicative interaction between the 
source-culture sender and a target-culture audience, using (certain aspects 
of) the source text as a model (Nord 1997: 50).  
In a documentary strategy, SI would then no longer attempt to mask features 
of the original speech such as idioms, humour, intertextual reference, perhaps 
even forms of address by replacing them with supposed cultural equivalents but 
would resort to a visible intervention by the interpreter to mediate them.5 
A further reason to refrain from assuming a single initial norm lies in the fact 
that, as already suggested by Shlesinger (1989), the interpreting setting is best 
construed as a system in order to study norms. But if this is the case, a broad 
socio-professional label like ‘conference interpreting’ can hardly be construed 
                                                          
4 Individual aspects of interpreting behaviour in a given setting may very well 
respond to a norm prescribing instrumental translation: in an interesting study that 
deserves a more thorough discussion, Turrini (2004) analyzed the way interpreters 
handle set and creative metaphors in a corpus of SI at a plenary session of the 
European Parliament. Turrini found a trend towards translating set metaphors non-
literally, i.e. with idiomatic equivalents. It would be interesting, however, to check 
whether realia, idioms, forms of address and humour are also translated in a TL-
oriented, idiomatic way or whether they sometimes lead to a non-functional output 
as in Pöchhacker’s corpus. As Turrini rightly recalls, the EP plenary is a sui generis 
setting in view of the notorious speed of delivery, planned speeches and unshared 
knowledge; however, I wonder if these very features do not make it a suitable 
setting for research into norms, as cognitive constraints can be taken to be at their 
relative peak for all interpreters involved. 
5 I have developed this argument with reference to the treatment of idioms in a more 
didactic paper to appear in the online Translation Journal (Marzocchi 
forthcoming b). 
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as single system, to which one could associate a single, default initial norm. 
This is obvious if one thinks of how this label actually covers (covers up, to a 
point) a wide variety of settings, ranging from the one-off conference serviced 
by highly mobile free-lance interpreters, to national or international 
organizations where staff interpreters serve for a whole career in a known range 
of meetings and for well-known customers, to settings that are in fact court 
proceedings, albeit at international level. The fact that the range of settings 
designated by ‘conference interpreting’ cannot be construed as a single system 
does not mean that some elements have no systemic, potentially normative 
effects across the range of settings: training institutions and professional 
associations come to mind as an example. But pretending that it is possible to 
formulate norms at the level of “conference interpreting” as a whole, and only at 
that level, means neglecting all the elements of each specific setting 
(institutional status and goal, membership, specific language policy a.o.) that 
enter, within the boundaries of the setting, into a systemic relationship with 
interpreting. The example discussed in the next section shows that it is at this 
level, and not at the level of a generic notion of “interpreting”, that norms 
emerge. 
4. Norms, institutions and ethics  
Both Gile and Shlesinger seem to take up the norms issue for its methodological 
potential, but somehow still as a by–product of studies focusing on cognitive 
aspects. This is of course in line with the researchers’ background and interests, 
and is reflected in the fact that both authors organize most of their examples of 
norms operating in interpreting around the quantitative metaphors of addition, 
omission, condensation, completeness, leaving out etc.6 My impression, 
however, is that the real potential of “norms” as a conceptual tool does not lie 
exclusively in the fact that it allows us to tune cognitive paradigms more finely, 
leading to “better calibrated metrics” in Gile’s terms. A wider significance of 
the notion of norms lies in the fact that it evokes the issue of ethics. I use the 
term still rather tentatively to designate both the body of codes of ethics, but 
also, more generally, any discourse relating translatorial choices to socially 
shared values. 
To build this argument, one has to develop an insight that emerged in 
Shlesinger’s 1999 contribution and, perhaps only implicitly so, in Gile’s 1998 
                                                          
6 This is only partly the case for Gile, who lists a series of statements that he sees as 
candidate to norm-status in interpreting. One of these statements, “maximizing the 
communication impact of the speech” (1998: 99), can be read as a TT-oriented 
initial norm. 
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paper. From her review of normative statements in the literature on interpreting 
in court and community settings, Shlesinger rightly observes that norms 
potentially collide, especially in institutional settings. Shlesinger sees  
a potential conflict between two sets of norms: expectancy norms 
implicitly or explicitly projected by the court, and performance norms 
based on the interpreter’s own perceptions of her role and of what she 
ought to do to fulfil it (1999: 66).  
The realization of the potential conflict of norms brings in another key actor, 
although only mentioned in passing in Shlesinger’s paper: institutions and the 
way they shape the norms interpreters are supposed to abide by.  
Again, court interpreting provides interesting examples: with the 
development of court interpreting in the US an explicit translational norm – the 
verbatim requirement, in fact a very strict initial and operational norm in 
Toury’s terms – was inserted into many of the codes of ethics adopted by courts 
and professional bodies (cf. Gonzales et al. 1991, Mikkelson 1996). The 
verbatim norm prescribes a very ST-oriented translation, including, as was 
mentioned above, the conservation (that is, the reproduction in the TT) of 
paralinguistic features, pauses, hedges, hesitations and the like. Its controversial 
adoption by the profession has accompanied a gain in status and the growing 
professionalization of the sector. At the same time, by framing interpreting 
within the usual conduit metaphor, the verbatim requirement seems to safeguard 
the different roles in the courtroom, protecting other actors from a potentially 
intrusive role of the interpreter as a would-be mediator or cross-cultural 
consultant.  
An initial norm comparable to the verbatim requirement is prescribed by the 
Code of Ethics for Interpreters and Translators adopted in 1999 by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, a body whose staff 
comprises both interpreters coming from the mainstream “conference” circuit in 
Europe and ad-hoc interpreters of a more “community” profile. The content of 
the Code ranges from fairly simple prescriptions on courtesy and timeliness, 
professional integrity and development, role delimitation vis-à-vis legal counsel 
to, on the other hand, a more sophisticated attempt to enforce complete 
conservation of all linguistic and paralinguistic features of the ST. The rule 
stems from a reference to “truth and completeness” in the crucial article 10 (note 
the reference to the wording); at the same time the Code seems to provide for 
some latitude and visibility for interpreters: paralinguistic clues are deemed 
relevant if they “facilitate the understanding”, and rectifying own errors as well 
as asking for clarifications are explicitly prescribed practices: 
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1. (a) Interpreters and translators shall convey with the greatest fidelity 
and accuracy, and with complete neutrality, the wording used by 
the persons they interpret or translate. 
1. (b) Interpreters shall convey the whole message, including vulgar or 
derogatory remarks, insults and any non-verbal clue, such as the 
tone of voice and emotions of the speaker, which might facilitate 
the understanding of their listeners. 
 […] 
2. (a) Interpreters and translators shall acknowledge and rectify 
promptly any mistake in their interpretation or translation. 
2. (b) If anything is unclear, interpreters and translators shall ask for 
repetition, rephrasing or explanation [my emphasis throughout]. 
The case of the verbatim requirement is a powerful illustration of how norms 
and ethics can interact. In the first place, it shows how ethical discourses in 
different settings go into varying degrees of detail in prescribing translational 
norms, be they initial or operational; indeed, the Tribunal establishes a clear link 
between the judicial setting and ethical discourse, when in the second recital it 
“considers that being subject to a Code of Ethics is an integral attribute of being 
an interpreter and translator employed in a judicial environment”. By contrast, 
the conference interpreting profession in Europe does not seem to have felt the 
need to spell out any initial norm in its code of ethics, apart from the generic 
appeal to faithfulness and professionalism (see Diriker 2004: 29-30 for a brief 
analysis of the AIIC code). Historians of the profession may wish to account for 
the different development.7 Secondly, the case of the verbatim requirement 
illustrates how the conflict between initial norms takes place at the level of 
ethics. The criticism of the verbatim requirement came out of value-based 
stances, pertaining to what kind of interpreting and how visible an interpreter 
role and status is better suited to serve the rights of the defendant or of whole 
ethnic communities, or even out of a more abstract idea of fair trial and justice.8 
                                                          
7 My own very idiosyncratic explanation, partially confirmed by the material 
analyzed by Falbo (2004), is that early scholarly writings on conference interpreting 
in Europe, written by recognized professionals and providing plenty of practical 
advice, did in fact replace an explicit translation norm in ethical discourse; they 
have since shaped the the self-perception of conference interpreters in Europe in 
much in the same way as explicit codes of ethics have done for court interpreting 
and other non-conference settings in the United States and elsewhere. Of course this 
is an interpretive hypothesis that cannot be retrospectively falsified. 
8 Similarly, in the discussion of translation within the European Institutions one finds 
the same narrative of conflicting norms (roughly literalist vs. functional) over-
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A further, anecdotal, illustration of how the discussion on norms almost 
automatically implies a discussion of ethical stances can be found in the 
following excerpts from an article by a professional in a semi-scholarly journal; 
here, the comments on a colleague’s conduct very quickly turn from an expert 
register (“inaccurate”, “key term”, “comparison”) to a discourse of values, rights 
and indeed sins (“entitlement”, “dirty lie”). Note that the controversy apparently 
starts with an issue of completeness (the colleague had omitted some 
embarrassing remarks, i.e. he had violated a norm prescribing completeness in 
sensitive settings) but then the ethical dimension prevails, to the extent that one 
section of the article carries the heading “Trust”:  
On a fine day in Windhoek, Namibia, the President ad-libbed a few 
remarks, as is his wont. At a certain point the interpreter stopped 
translating, looked at the President, and interrupted: “Presidente, não 
estou entendendo”, a remark that can be construed both as Mr. President, 
I cannot understand what you say or Mr. President, I cannot understand 
why you are saying this. […] The President must have heard his 
interpreter, since he repeated the phrase and added a second phrase, so as 
to build a comparison. The interpreter then provided what would usually 
be considered an inaccurate rendering of the first part of the comparison 
and omitted what would generally be considered a key term from the 
second. […] Now, why isn’t the wilful deletion of a couple words from a 
presidential speech considered a lie [..]? A lie is a lie, of course, and 
although there may be cases where a lie is ethically justified, such as 
when a life is in danger, we should be really careful with exceptions. […] 
I am sure the audience wants to know what the President of Brazil said, 
not what his interpreter thought he ought to have said instead. I would go 
farther than that: the audience is entitled to know what the President said 
(Nogueira 2004, my emphasis). 
It is also worth noting that Nogueira’s account is sophisticated enough to 
reconcile a completeness norm, named here an “exact translation”, with the 
ethical stance that he concedes as a possible line of conduct for the interpreter, 
i.e. to “try and prevent fights”. The reconciliation is possible by stretching the 
interpreter’s role into that of a neutral but visible intercultural consultant who is 
the principal of some communicative acts (“letting the parties understand”), as 
appears from the following excerpt (note also that the discourse is about 
participants having rights: “I am entitled”):  
[colleagues] told stories of how an interpreter prevented a fight by 
omitting insulting statements from the translation. Great. But, first, if 
                                                                                                                                 
arched, for example in Wagner et al. 2002, by a value-based discourse on the 
function of institutional communication with citizens (cf. also Marzocchi 2004). 
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someone calls me an &$#@!!! to my face in a foreign language I believe 
I’m entitled to know what he said and, second, the purpose of avoiding a 
fight might have been equally well served by providing an exact 
translation and letting the parties understand that the other guy was mad 
as hell and meant business, too (Nogueira 2004, my emphasis).  
5. Three reasons to step up research on norms in interpreting 
Up to now I have argued, with the help of a few illustrations from scholarly and 
professional discourse, that norms are not only a complement to cognitive 
paradigms, that norms have to do with institutions, and that they also have to do 
with ethics, i.e. with the values presiding over translation. There are three 
further reasons why I insist on advocating a fuller use of the notion of norms 
(we might as well call for a “thicker” notion) in research on institutional and 
social aspects of interpreting.  
Firstly, if we look for an ethical construct9 that can inform interpreting 
behaviour across the range of modes and settings, the lack of an explicit 
translational norm in ethical discourse is a missing link, a grey area in the way 
the conference interpreting profession depicts itself. Investigating ethical 
discourses that include an explicit initial norm as developed in other fields of 
interpreting can help the profession fill this gap – court interpreting, but also 
Sign Language interpreting are obvious candidates for this exercise. Ultimately, 
I would like to see norms emerge from the way the profession perceives the 
communicative needs of a given setting, rather than being dictated by purely 
institutional needs – as was probably the case with the verbatim requirement in 
US court interpreting – or simply taken for granted with a vague reference to 
fidelity, as is the case today in conference interpreting.  
Let me exemplify what I mean by the latter: elsewhere (Marzocchi 
forthcoming a) I have suggested that the defining feature of the EU institutions 
as a setting for language work is the complex configuration of languages in 
contact that prevails in the daily life of the institutions, despite official discourse 
focusing on isolated languages and identities. I have argued that relevant 
translational norms should be inspired by this feature, and that interpreting in 
such a setting cannot possibly be based upon the assumption that languages and 
cultures are isolated and that official language and mother tongue coincide. In 
other words, an initial norm should be elaborated that builds on and 
acknowledges the highly stratified language repertoire skilfully exploited by 
(some) speakers in that setting, as was documented in another thesis at Trieste 
                                                          
9 In fact, this has been my own (re)search as a professional prior to any scholarly 
endeavour. 
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(cf. Aquino 2001) on a corpus of speeches from the European Parliament 
plenary. 
Secondly, a fresh normative elaboration by the profession could overcome 
some paradoxes between interpreter behaviour and norms governing language 
work in the same institutional setting, which I see particularly in the treatment 
of idioms and realia. Another anecdote can illustrate this point: European Court 
of Justice, spring 2004, novice colleagues from Poland are practising in the 
dummy booth. Suddenly one of the parties in the hearing uses the English 
expression “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”. The Polish colleague, 
who later reported thinking “we don’t say that in Polish” and “I cannot possibly 
talk about puddings in Polish”, renders the idiomatic expression in plain 
language, neutralizing the idiom. Later on another participant refers to what the 
previous speaker has said, takes up the “pudding” image again and in a perfect 
instance of intertextual reference develops it, half-jokingly, for a couple of 
sentences. The other colleague on the microphone at the moment cannot refer 
back to anything similar to puddings in the previous output of her booth mate. In 
normative terms, and excluding for the moment cognitive constraints,10 the first 
colleague seems to have been trying to adhere to a ‘full cultural transfer’ norm 
prescribing idiomaticity and proscribing a hybrid TT. For some reason she could 
not come up with a more literal or mediated solution, that would have provided 
material for intertextual reference in the TT (for example framing it as in: “as 
they say in English, the proof of the pudding…”).  
The anecdote is particularly telling since it involved trainee interpreters, who 
are arguably more prone to norm-compliant behaviour. This contrasts sharply 
with an institutional setting that frequently resorts to literalist solutions leading 
to a strikingly hybrid TT, especially as regards the written translation of a 
specific type of realia, i.e. names of institutional bodies in legal texts. The 
striking juxtaposition of languages begins already on the cover pages of case 
documents, where a uniform layout tells us what the original language was as 
well as the official denominations of the parties and of the referring jurisdiction 
in their respective languages. The body of the translations illustrates the practice 
of keeping institutional names in the original language, possibly adding an 
explanation in brackets, even when the translation between cognate languages 
could allow for a calque; this is now an explicit norm of written translation at 
the ECJ and is visible in all case documents available to interpreters. One 
wonders, then, how powerful the idiomaticity norm must be to prevent my 
trainee colleagues from producing even a slightly hybrid output, for example 
                                                          
10 The comments made by the colleague afterwards led me to explain the anecdote 
with a deliberate choice of idiomaticity of the TT rather than of lack of processing 
resources to come up with equivalents for, say, the lexical item “pudding” (cf. also 
Marzocchi forthcoming b). 
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importing what is after all a fairly transparent idiom; and this in a setting where 
they are surrounded by an extremely visible translation practice (considering the 
pile of documents that ECJ interpreters are supposed to go through to prepare 
for the hearing) that displays its hybrid features on every page of the documents.  
Anecdotes like this one also reinforce the doubts on cultural adaptation as a 
viable norm for interpreting, especially in settings where language contact is so 
obvious and interaction so structured that intertextual reference is the rule rather 
than the exception. To tackle this issue, research should not be limited to 
operational norms (e.g. Shlesinger’s “condensation” norm) and should venture 
into the ethically mined field of initial norms, that imply a basic option as to 
what translators and interpreters are there for in a given setting.  
A final reason why research into norms and interpreting should be linked to 
ethical discourse has to do with an overtly personal and possibly misplaced 
dissatisfaction with the following: we ‘inherited’ the notion of norms from DTS 
scholars who had used it, not without some intellectual daring, to legitimize 
variability in translatorial behaviour as the object of study in TS; in the study of 
interpreting, however, I see the risk of it being applied in an innocuous version 
that does not challenge the core of our received wisdom. This was already partly 
the case in Harris’ (1990) reply to Shlesinger. Harris first listed several 
examples of variability in interpreter behaviour as evidence for the operation of 
different norms in different settings; yet he then made his case irrelevant with a 
final statement to the effect that “under all circumstances” all interpreters are 
assumed to serve as an “honest spokesperson”, and convey the “ideas and 
manner of the speaker” as accurately as possible. 
 There is some merit in an ethics centred around the notion of “honesty”, in a 
move not unlike Nord’s proposal of “loyalty” as an overarching principle that 
informs translatorial behaviour within her functional approach (Nord 1997, ch. 
8); at least, this would be in line with the traditional discourse based on the 
virtue of the fidus interpres. However, the problem with such a statement is that 
a single explicit accuracy criterion – an initial norm – cannot automatically be 
derived from the qualification as a “honest spokesperson”; and this is precisely 
because of the operation of socially and historically determined norms; in other 
words, the same bona fide honest spokesperson will perform in (slightly?) 
different ways in different settings. Denying this, and subsuming all forms and 
settings of interpreting under the umbrella of an undefined notion of fidelity “to 
the ideas and manners” of the speaker, means adopting the notion of norms only 
superficially. It amounts to neglecting the main lesson that can be derived from 
its application, precisely a lesson in undefining. 
The same could be said of a more recent contribution by Garzone (2002), 
that deserves a closer look. The author reviews the debate on quality in 
simultaneous interpreting and traces the move from early, error-based notions of 
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quality to more recent, context-aware approaches that raise the issue of how to 
model all relevant variables; she puts forward the notion of norms as the 
principle  
located at a sufficiently high level of generalization to explain the ration-
ale underlying the interpreter’s behaviour and choices, thus providing a 
basis for understanding the intrinsic quality of a given SI performance as 
well as the user’s quality expectations (Garzone 2002: 110-111). 
Garzone then identifies case- and corpus studies on interpreted speech, 
together with the analysis of discourse on interpreting, as the source of evidence 
for norms. She illustrates the socio-cultural specificity and the instability of 
preliminary norms by reference to the norm favouring interpretation into the 
mother tongue (specific to Western international organizations and increasingly 
challenged with, for example, the successive enlargements of the EU). Her 
discussion of operational norms focuses on the issue of completeness. In slight 
contradiction to Shlesinger (1999), Garzone states that 
One of the basic norms shared by the interpreting community is that the 
interpreter should give a complete rendition of the ST, which in theory 
would rule out omissions (Garzone 2002: 114). 
Departures from this norm, which are widely documented in literature, are 
then seen as “repair and emergency strategies which contribute to assuring the 
quality of the final product” (2002: 115). A section is then dedicated to the 
“variability of norms and quality criteria across cultures, space and time”: 
quality, both from the interpreter’s and the user’s perspective, is redefined in 
terms of the negotiation between ideal norm and repair strategies (the latter 
made necessary, according to Garzone, by the fact that “most of the time” 
interpreters work in an “emergency situation”, 2002: 117).11 
Although one cannot but agree with Garzone’s reasoning on quality and 
possibly with its didactic implications, something is missing in her discussion. 
Garzone does not mention Toury’s category of initial norms (1995: 56), those 
governing a broad orientation towards the source or the target system, i.e. 
orienting a translator’s decision in solving the tension between adequacy and 
acceptability. I would argue that initial norms are highly relevant, as they are the 
ones more closely related to ethical discourse on translation.  
The reason for this omission may be linked to the end of her paper. The 
conclusion reached by Garzone is that user surveys on quality criteria are prone 
to ideological distortion, because of the gap between the ideal norm and the 
repair strategies that users too are willing to deploy to maintain communication. 
                                                          
11 Perhaps an overestimation of objectively difficult working conditions. 
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A consequence of this is that “quality assurance rests exclusively on 
interpreters”, as the only “guarantors of the intrinsic quality and fidelity of the 
TT to the ST”; at the same time they have to make sure the finished product is 
“sufficiently fluent, plausible and coherent” not to lose the user’s confidence. 
However this “formal” criterion should not be used as a substitute for “real 
fidelity to the ST” (all quotes from 2002: 118, emphasis in the original). In my 
reading, Garzone thus places the ultimate responsibility back on the interpreter, 
so it is only to be expected that her paper should end with a discussion of ethics. 
However, in a slightly inconsistent ending, the author insists on a conceptual 
distinction between ethics and deontology that effectively defuses the potential 
for variability inherent in a norm-based approach, just as happened in the end of 
Harris’s paper. Deontology is taken to refer to the professional commitment to 
provide the best possible product; ethics would then refer to the moral 
orientation informing the choices made by an “upright person” outside the 
professional sphere but possibly “interfering” with deontology. The distinction 
is then developed by stating that the “formal acceptability” of the TT would be 
prescribed by professional deontology, whereas a properly ethical stance would 
also prescribe “fidelity to the letter and spirit” of the ST (2002: 119).  
Garzone’s goal in upholding this distinction may well be to put a conceptual 
emergency brake againonst the relativistic drift hidden in a socially determined 
notion of quality; if this is the case, the goal is certainly worth sharing. Yet I 
doubt that it can be reached through the idea of an intrinsic quality of 
interpreting across the whole range of settings, framed in terms of an 
unspecified fidelity to the letter and the spirit of the ST, reminiscent, among 
other things, of Harris’s “honest spokesperson”. This would mean precisely that 
the descriptive scholar would nevertheless approach interpreting with a built-in 
norm, thereby wasting the whole intellectual effort invested in the move to a 
descriptive, norm-based approach in the first place. 
Awareness of norms could also inform the selection of hypotheses and the 
way they are formulated in our own scientific rhetoric. This can be illustrated by 
reference to an interesting corpus-based study by Van Besien and Meuleman 
(2004), where they look at the way two simultaneous interpreters handle 
repaired and unrepaired speech errors by the speaker in a corpus of Dutch into 
English interpreting. Confirming their main hypothesis, their finding is that “in 
more than 4 out of 5 cases interpreters correct speakers’ unrepaired errors and 
translate speakers’ repairs without translating the original utterance”, which is in 
line with experience and teaching practice in conference interpreting (but would 
go against apparent norms in some court settings, as we have seen). Whereas I 
by no means question the relevance or plausibility of the result, there may be 
something slightly circular in the evaluative discourse in which they frame it: 
the hypothesis that interpreters, being listener/client-centred, “will always try to 
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produce a correct and unambiguous message”, i.e. they will not reproduce 
speech errors, is related at the outset to a distinction between “good” and “not-
so-good” interpreters (2004: 65). Instances where the interpreters, seemingly 
without much effort, only translated the repaired utterance are repeatedly 
labelled as “successful translation” (2004: 77). More awareness of different 
norms would probably have led the authors to frame their finding, in itself a 
relevant one, in more detached terms. 
The point in approaching interpreting as norm-governed behaviour, in 
conclusion, is to acknowledge and account for the fact that “fidelity to the letter 
and the spirit”, or the difference between good and not-so-good, means different 
things in different settings (again, perhaps only slightly different things). While 
the interpreting profession developed in different settings in society, the 
translation-normative discourse that accompanied it has intertwined with ethical 
issues to such an extent that there is not much methodological point in adopting 
the concept of norms without accepting the undefining potential, the awareness 
of variability, and ultimately the risk of relativism that it carries with it from 
TS.12 This variability extends all the way up to the choice of initial norms and to 
the ethical, value-based definition of the interpreter’s role in each specific 
setting. Excluding from the scope of socially- and historically determined norms 
an undetermined essential quid, that should characterize all interpreting under 
all circumstances (Harris’ “honest spokesperson”, Garzone’s ethics of “fidelity 
to the letter and the spirit”) implies making the notion of norms a blunt 
conceptual tool, without much “added value”, i.e. additional explanatory power, 
compared to less abstract and more process-oriented notions such as techniques 
and strategies.  
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